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1 
LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT: SHOULD THE 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZE THE MORTGAGES OF 
PRIVATELY-OWNED, SMALL MULTIFAMILY 
BUILDINGS? 
DAVID REISS* 
INTRODUCTION 
For a large part of the twentieth century, the absence of stable 
financing has caused difficulties for owners of small, urban, multifamily 
buildings.
1
  Toward the end of the twentieth century, the secondary 
market for multifamily mortgages matured, which has increased to some 
extent the availability of credit for small-apartment-building owners.
2
  
 
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  This Article was presented at Western New 
England College School of Law‘s 2008 ―Entrepreneurship in a Global Economy‖ Conference.  
I would like to thank Stacy Caplow, Arlo Chase, Nestor Davidson, Steven Dean, and Ken 
Levy, as well as participants in a Brooklyn Law School faculty workshop, for helpful 
comments.  I would also like to thank Jason Gang, William Garrett, and Philip Tucker for 
superb research assistance.  The author also acknowledges the support of the Brooklyn Law 
School Summer Research Stipend Program.  Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the 
Brooklyn Law School library for help locating a variety of difficult-to-find sources. 
1. See, e.g., GEORGE STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 196-202 (1966) (calling 
for, among other things, longer term mortgage money in order to stabilize urban tenement 
buildings).  Unless otherwise noted, I use the term ―multifamily housing‖ to refer to buildings 
containing more than four units.  This distinction is necessary because, historically, the 
Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac refer to buildings with five or 
more units as ―multifamily‖ and grouped two- to four-unit buildings with single-family 
homes.  William Apgar & Shekar Narasimhan, Enhancing Access to Capital for Smaller 
Unsubsidized Multifamily Rental Properties 1 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., 
Paper No. RR07-8, 2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07-
8_apgar.pdf.  Where noted, I may refer to buildings with two- to four-units as multifamily as 
well.  See Emily N. Zietz, Multifamily Housing: A Review of Theory and Evidence, 25 J. REAL 
EST. RES. 185, 186 (2003) (cataloging various definitions of ―multifamily housing‖). 
2. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MEETING MULTIFAMILY 
HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS DURING AND AFTER THE CREDIT CRISIS: A POLICY BRIEF 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/multifamily_housing_finance_needs.pdf 
(―The multifamily finance system in the United States is effective, credit-worthy, and unlike 
the single-family system has maintained strong underwriting throughout the decade.‖).  The 
Joint Center study focuses on the impact of the credit crisis on the multifamily sector.  See 
generally id.  This Article does not directly address the impact of the ongoing credit crisis on 
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At the same time, the small-apartment-building housing stock is 
shrinking due to abandonment, demolition, foreclosure, and other 
causes.
3
  Because small apartment buildings house many low-income 
families, scholars affiliated with Harvard University‘s Joint Center for 
Housing Studies (the ―Joint Center‖) have suggested that financing costs 
for the owners of such buildings should be subsidized in order to protect 
this affordable housing stock and its occupants.  The most well-
developed proposal arising from this sentiment is for the federal 
government to sponsor small Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-REITs) to 
pool ownership of multiple properties, which would allow small-
building owners to accrue a number of significant government 
subsidies.
4
 
There is, however, no major market failure in the mortgage market 
for small multifamily buildings even though such mortgages tend to be 
more expensive than mortgages for large multifamily buildings.
5
  
Moreover, available subsidies are likely to be used more efficiently if 
larger buildings were subsidized because the underwriting of mortgages 
has high fixed costs.
6
  Finally, it is unclear if landlords will pass on a 
meaningful portion of the subsidy to tenants.  Thus, such a proposal 
should not be implemented. 
This Article has two goals.  First, to provide as thorough a history 
of the small-apartment owner and small multifamily properties as can be 
cobbled together from the existing literature.  This will fill the need for a 
comprehensive overview of this important, yet relatively unexplored, 
portion of the housing stock.  And second, to use the S-REIT proposal as 
a lens with which to evaluate the role the government should play in the 
continued viability of this segment of the housing stock. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, it describes what little is 
known about the owners of small multifamily properties and the 
properties themselves.  Second, it describes the lending environment 
faced by real-estate entrepreneurs over the last hundred years.  Finally, it 
concludes by arguing against proposals to implement affordable housing 
 
the multifamily housing sector.  Rather, it addresses structural issues that preceded—and in all 
likelihood will follow—the credit crisis. 
3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA‘S RENTAL 
HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 20 (2008) [hereinafter AMERICA‘S 
RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_americas_rental_housing/rh08_america
s_rental_housing.pdf. 
4. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
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goals by subsidizing small-apartment-building owners. 
I. THE SMALL-MULTIFAMILY-PROPERTY OWNER AND THE SMALL 
MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY 
Owners of small, urban, multifamily buildings are often thought of 
as ―slumlords.‖  George Sternlieb and Robert Burchell challenged the 
image of the ―slumlord‖ as the most appropriate one to describe the 
typical small-time landlord.
7
  This is because the small-apartment-
building owner is not a homogenous category.  While the category does 
include the archetypical slumlord, it also includes the occupant-owner of 
a very small multi-unit building; the amateur real-estate investor who 
invests excess capital in a tax-advantaged real-estate transaction; the 
realtor or other real-estate professional whose business expands to 
include management and ownership of real estate; the first-generation 
immigrant looking to enter the middle class through ownership of real 
estate; the absentee, and typically passive, investor; as well as the 
speculator.
8
  And indeed, as the vitality of cities has increased from the 
mid-twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, the ―slumlord‖ 
has begun to give way to the ―urban pioneer‖ as a prevailing image we 
have of the owner of small, urban rental properties.
9
 
 
7. GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE 
TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED 54 (1973); see also LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT 
AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 39 (1968) (arguing that the ―tenement 
house movement helped fix [the slumlord] in his permanent position as an American devil and 
scapegoat‖); Michael A. Stegman, Slumlords and Public Policy, 33 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 419, 
421 (1967) (stating that George Sternlieb helps ―dispel[] the myth of slumlords as a 
monolithic group of misanthropes who derive their livelihoods in units of human suffering 
rather than in dollars of rental receipts‖). 
8. See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER CITY: THE 
DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 27 (1972) (finding a similarly diverse group of landlords, although 
with greater concentration of ownership among real-estate professionals, in study of 
Baltimore); STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 121-84 (describing many types of multifamily-
building owners found in his study of Newark); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 7 (reviewing 
studies from multiple jurisdictions that demonstrated that many slum landlords lived in or near 
their properties); Alan Mallach, Landlords at the Margins: Exploring the Dynamics of the One 
to Four Unit Rental Housing Industry 23 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper 
No. RR07-15, 2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07-
15_mallach.pdf (arguing that in ―the final analysis, there is no such thing as a typical owner‖ 
of one- to four-unit properties).  Another often overlooked type of owner is the ―inadvertent‖ 
landlord who had initially purchased the rental building (often a single-family) as her primary 
residence, only to move on to another property while retaining the first as an investment.  Id. 
at 27-28. 
9. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 53 (describing the folk figure of the 
slumlord as an ―overfed individual‖ who is ―securing a more than adequate return on his 
properties‖).  In the popular imagination, rental housing is most often located in urban areas.  
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There are few facts that we know about these landlords in general 
(a category that also includes owners of single-unit rental properties).
10
  
Indeed, the absolute breadth of the ―landlord‖ class seems to bear out the 
fact that no one stereotype can capture the entirety: some 4.3 million 
households reported earning rental income from a second property (not 
necessarily multifamily) in the 2001 Residential Finance Survey.
11
  The 
 
And, indeed, the facts bear this out: more than half of all rental units are located within ten 
miles of the central business districts of the ninety-one largest metro regions in the country.  
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING 
22 (2006) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006)], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/son2006.pdf.  Moreover, 
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, the four most populous states, ―account for 41 
percent of multifamily properties and 42 percent of multifamily units.‖  Amy S. Bogdon & 
James R. Follain, Multifamily Housing: An Exploratory Analysis Using the 1991 Residential 
Finance Survey, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 79, 84 (1996).  The ―urban pioneer‖ is a bit of catchall 
slang for those who choose to move to ―transitional areas.‖  See MICH. DEP‘T OF LABOR & 
ECON. GROWTH, 2005 COOL CITIES GRANTS & PLANNING PROGRAMS PRE-BID WORKSHOP 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2005) (on file with author), defining ―urban pioneer‖ as 
a person who had vision for a blighted urban area who moved into the area and 
worked to restore the neighborhood.  We now think of the term to describe anyone 
who lives in an urban neighborhood or moves to an urban neighborhood to either 
restore or maintain it.  Some of those urban pioneers are empty nesters, young 
knowledge workers, developers, immigrants, creative workforce, or persons with 
passion for their city who believe in building or rebuilding a vibrant community.  
No matter what age a person is, one who moves into a transitional area to be part of 
the rebirth of that neighborhood.  An urban pioneer can also be a developer who is 
investing in the neighborhood. 
Id. 
10. There is really a surprising lack of research in this area, a problem that goes back 
quite far into the twentieth century.  See, e.g., J. E. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING: 
COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE 16 (1956) (noting that it is typically impossible to 
disaggregate multifamily finance data from commercial and industrial finance data); Arthur D. 
Sporn, Empirical Studies in the Economics of Slum Ownership, 36 LAND ECON. 333, 333 
(1960) (―[S]eriously documented studies of the economics of owning and renting substandard 
housing are rare.‖); see also James R. Follain, Some Possible Directions for Research on 
Multifamily Housing, 5 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE, 533, 543 (1994) (noting that academic 
literature on multifamily housing and multifamily housing finance is scarce); Kerry D. 
Vandell, Multifamily Finance: A Pathway to Housing Goals, a Bridge to Commercial 
Mortgage Market Efficiency, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 319, 320 (2000) (noting that there is less 
data available on conditions in the multifamily market than on the single-family market); cf. 
COMMUNITY HOUSING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM [CHIP], PHASE 2 STUDY: EXPANDED 
SURVEY OF OWNERS OF RENT STABILIZED PROPERTY 14 (2009) (report prepared by 
Urbanomics, on file with author) (noting that ―[r]elatively little data has been collected on 
individual owners of rent stabilized properties throughout [New York] City‖ and that the 
present study only represents the ―[Rent Stabilization Association] certified member 
universe‖). 
11. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 23.  Of the 4.3 
million who earn rental income, 3.4 million report owning only one rental property and at 
least one third of that 3.4 million own a single-family rental unit.  Id.  The 2001 Residential 
Finance Survey is part of the decennial U.S. Census.  See Residential Finance Survey—
Overview, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/rfs/overview.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).  It 
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survey also found that individuals and married couples owned 19.3 
million rental units, including eighty-four percent of one- to four-unit 
properties and sixty-five percent of five- to nineteen-unit properties.
12
  
These owners tend, unsurprisingly, to be older and wealthier than the 
general population at large,
13
 although a surprisingly large number of 
owners are low-income themselves.
14
 
Small ―multifamily rentals are likely to be owned by individuals 
with few property holdings.‖15  Owners of smaller properties typically 
manage their properties themselves in order to save on the fees that 
would have to be paid to a professional manager.
16
  That being said, for 
most of these owners, managing their properties is at most a part-time 
job.
17
  Not infrequently, they reside in their properties.
18
 
 
should be noted that there are few sources of data about landlords that are regularly updated.  
As such, this Article will make reference to various studies from the last twenty years.  The 
reader should rely on the older studies with care, as the multifamily market has changed 
significantly during that period. 
12. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S 
HOUSING 21 (2007) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007)], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf.  Business 
organizations and other institutions owned 15.6 million rental units.  Id.; JOINT CTR. FOR 
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE 
NATION 22 (2006) [hereinafter AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE 
NATION], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh06_americas_rental_housing.pdf 
(―According to the Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS)—perhaps the most 
comprehensive look at owner characteristics—most individuals have fewer than ten rental 
units, and many have just one.‖).  For a thorough study of the one- to four-family housing 
stock, see Mallach, supra note 8.  Mallach finds that ―[n]early half of all owners of single 
family detached rental properties own only a single property, with another quarter owning two 
to four properties, while 70 percent of the owners of two-family rental properties own either 
one or two properties.‖  Id. at 19.  Individuals and couples own in excess of eighty percent of 
all one- to four-family rental units.  Id. at 20; see also LENORE SCHLOMING & SKIP 
SCHLOMING, THE ROAD HOME: WORKING WITH SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS TO PRESERVE 
AND CREATE AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING, available at 
http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/bgc_roadhome.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
13. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 21. 
14. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S 
HOUSING 23 (2002) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002)], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/Son2002.pdf (―Many nonresident owners 
of nine or fewer rental units have low incomes themselves, with almost a third reporting 
annual incomes of under $30,000.‖). 
15. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S 
HOUSING 21 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2001)], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/SON2001.pdf. 
16. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 24. 
17. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; see also 
Mallach, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that about three-fourths of owners of one- to four-
family rental units work in a field unrelated to property ownership and only a handful of such 
owners earn all of their income from property ownership).  A recent Joint Center paper argues 
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There is also some useful data about smaller multifamily properties 
themselves, as distinct from the owners of such properties.
19
  These 
smaller properties make up a large share of the multifamily market: 
buildings with fewer than fifty units make up 88.5% of multifamily 
properties, and those with fewer than twenty units make up 74.9% of 
multifamily properties.
20
  While small buildings make up the bulk of all 
multifamily buildings, they make up a much smaller portion of total 
multifamily units: only about one-third of multifamily rental units are in 
five- to forty-nine-unit buildings.
21
 
Small rental properties tend to be significantly older than larger 
ones.  Older properties tend to be in poorer condition and are thus 
typically more expensive to maintain, with the cost compounded by the 
fact that they typically house lower-income residents.
22
  Of course, such 
tenants are less able to pay increased rent for improved maintenance.  
The units in this sector thus tend to be more affordable than units in 
larger buildings; this affordability is not surprising given their 
 
for experimentation with ownership models for smaller properties as owners of such 
properties face a host of problems with them.  Revisiting Rental Housing Policy: Observations 
from a National Summit 17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 
W07-2, 2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/w07-
2_revisiting_rental_policy_brief.pdf [hereinafter Revisiting Rental Housing Policy]. 
18. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (using 1997 
data). 
19. For a brief history of the multifamily housing stock, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ ET 
AL., MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 8-16 (2000). 
20. CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ABT ASSOCS. INC., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
AVAILABILITY AND COST OF FINANCING FOR SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES 5 (2001), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/smallmultifamily.pdf (using data from 
HUD PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS SURVEY (1996), 
http://www.huduser.org/DATASETS/poms.html). 
21. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7. 
22. See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 22-23; Jack 
Goodman, Determinants of Operating Costs of Multifamily Rental Housing 20 (Joint Ctr. for 
Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-7, 2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-7.pdf (estimating that utility costs are 
fifty-five percent less at properties built in 1990s than for similar properties built in 1970s); 
see also Ann B. Schnare, The Impact of Changes in Multifamily Housing Finance on Older 
Urban Areas 4 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Urban and Metro. Policy & Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Studies of Harvard Univ., 2001), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/schnarefinal.pdf (noting that households living in the 
multifamily housing stock tend to be younger and poorer ―than the average American 
household‖).  For a discussion of the characteristics of the middle market for rentals, see 
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MIDDLE MARKET RENTALS: 
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT (2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/mmr04-1_middle_market_rentals.pdf. 
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condition.
23
  Small multifamily properties themselves are 
disproportionately located in communities with lower-income residents, 
higher poverty rates, and lower homeownership rates.
24
  This 
combination of higher operating costs and lower rents makes smaller 
multifamily buildings a less attractive investment opportunity, all other 
things being equal. 
The small multifamily subsector offers opportunities to burgeoning 
entrepreneurs but also carries great risks.
25
  As the Joint Center has 
noted, many of these units are ―owned by individuals with limited 
capacity to maintain and manage rental properties.  Moreover, even the 
most sophisticated owners of smaller rental properties find it difficult to 
secure funds to maintain or upgrade their units.‖26 
As a result, ―[f]or many of these landlords, the ventures are 
unprofitable: in 1995, thirty-two percent of owners with fewer than 10 
units reported losses on their investments.‖27  Given all of this bad news 
about owning rental units, it comes as no surprise that well over half of 
small nonresident owners would not have purchased their properties if 
they could do it all over again.
28
  Notwithstanding this state of affairs, 
 
23. See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; William 
Segal, Segmentation in the Multifamily Mortgage Market: Evidence from the Residential 
Finance Survey, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 175, 178 (2003).  The Bureau of the Census‘s 1991 
Survey of Residential Finance found that rents in five- to forty-nine-unit properties were 
eighty-four percent of rents in larger properties.  HERBERT, supra note 20, at 1. 
24. Bogdon & Follain, supra note 9, at 114. 
25. Owner-occupants of two- to four-unit buildings are more likely to be ―urban, blue-
collar, and less affluent than single-family homeowners.‖  See Mallach, supra note 8, at 21.  
They are also more likely to be people of color.  Id. 
26. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23. 
27. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2001), supra note 15, at 21; see also Amy 
S. Bogdon & David C. Ling, The Effects of Property, Owner, Location and Tenant 
Characteristics on Multifamily Profitability, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 285, 314 (1998) (a study of 
multifamily properties, finding that ―[p]roperties held by nonprofits and corporations are less 
profitable, all else equal, than those held by other ownership structures‖).  Owner-occupiers, 
however, have fewer losses, with only fourteen percent of them reporting losses in 1995.  Id.  
The Joint Center analysis does not appear to take into account the extent to which some 
investors purchase property with the express intent of incurring operating losses to offset 
current income and with the hope of future capital gains.  See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON, 
SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 66 (1972) (noting that major tax benefits available to owners of 
rental property is depreciation deduction in excess of actual decrease in fair market value); 
Kathy M. Kristof, A Primer on Real Estate Tax Breaks, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at U9 
(―[D]epreciation expenses frequently reflect phantom costs that can be used to shelter 
otherwise taxable income.‖); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980‘S 
48-49 (1983) (describing tax-advantaged status in the early 1980s of real-estate investments 
over alternate investments). 
28. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23.  One imagines 
that this figure has only increased during the Great Recession. 
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landlords of small rental properties also tend to hold them for a long 
time, although the speculation that was rampant in the early 2000s may 
have altered this pattern.
29
 
While it is unlikely that many small-apartment-building owners 
purchase buildings in order to provide affordable housing to low- and 
moderate-income people, policymakers and affordable-housing 
advocates have identified such owners as key players in affordable-
housing policy.  Indeed, the Joint Center writes that the ―fate of the 
affordable housing supply . . . relies critically on finding ways to assist 
these small property owners in preserving rental buildings.‖30  Because 
of fixed transaction costs, however, it is more expensive on a per-unit 
basis—thus much less common—to subsidize owners of smaller 
multifamily properties as opposed to owners of larger multifamily 
properties.
31
  The Joint Center‘s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan 
argue that because new production is directed at larger buildings, small 
multifamily buildings are ―at risk of loss to disinvestment, demolition 
and abandonment.‖32 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SMALL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE FINANCE 
Loan underwriting had historically been a very local activity, one 
that was based on a careful evaluation of an individual‘s financial 
prospects, reliability, and place within the community.  Local thrifts, in 
particular, were very active in small multifamily lending, until the 
 
29. See Mallach, supra note 8, at 22 (finding that the typical owner of one- to four-unit 
properties in 2001 has owned property for nine years); see also STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, 
supra note 7, at 55 (finding that nearly forty percent of buildings in a study of Newark ―have 
been in the same hands for eleven or more years‖). 
30. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 22.  This is an 
issue that disparately impacts communities of color.  Id.  In 2005, the minority share of renter 
households was forty-three percent and growing.  Id. 
31. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (noting that 
―major supply-side housing assistance programs—including the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit—typically provide subsidies to larger properties, even though most renters needing 
assistance live in smaller properties‖); Donald S. Bradley et al., An Examination of Mortgage 
Debt Characteristics and Financial Risk Among Multifamily Properties, 10 J. HOUSING. 
ECON. 482, 487 (2001) (noting that smaller properties ―are also less likely to receive direct 
government assistance, including Section 8, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, government 
grants and/or property tax relief‖ and that ―[o]nly thirty-four percent of small properties 
reported that they receive some type of government assistance, compared to fifty-six percent 
of large developments‖). 
32. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 3; see also Stegman, supra note 7, at 419 
(―While national policy is committed to the goal of providing every American family with a 
decent home, one extremely scarce housing resource, the low-rent sector of the privately 
owned housing inventory, is being squandered.‖).  Apgar and Narasimhan‘s point applies just 
as much to housing preservation efforts to the extent that they too focus on large projects. 
REISS 10 6/25/2010  12:16 PM 
2010] LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT 9 
savings-and-loan crisis and the real-estate downturn of the 1980s 
reduced their activity in this area.
33
  Since the 1980s, however, there has 
been a great change in multifamily property finance as the commercial 
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) industry took off.  This movement 
from local to global mortgage funding had a profound impact on the 
financing options available for small multifamily properties. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, entrepreneurs, 
particularly those who were different in some way (real or perceived) 
from their local bankers, faced great difficulty in obtaining financing 
from their local banks.
34
  This difficulty was intensified in inner-city 
areas.
35
  In the absence of financing from established lenders, more 
sympathetic savings and loans arose in established immigrant 
communities.
36
  Borrowers also turned to informal lenders who would 
lend within a particular ethnic group.
37
  These so-called ―immigrant 
lenders‖ gave ―many simple shopkeepers and small-scale entrepreneurs 
ready access to large pools of capital and . . . they overwhelmingly 
invested these funds in local real estate either as unlicensed lenders or as 
direct builders and purchasers.‖38  Because of the lack of access to 
 
33. See Denise DiPasquale & Jean L. Cummings, Financing Multifamily Rental 
Housing: The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors, 3 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 77, 78 
(1992); James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework for Evaluating 
Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. 
& RES. 151, 151-52 (1995); see also Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 7 (―Indeed, by 
2001, S&Ls provided just 17.2 percent of financing to properties with 5 to 49 units, compared 
to 36.9 percent in 1991.‖). 
34. Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community: Informal Banking in Immigrant 
Communities in the United States, 1880–1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (2002) (noting that 
immigrants were not usually welcomed at traditional banks); see also SAM B. WARNER, JR., 
STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-1900, at 117-24 (1961) 
(describing typically complex financing of residential projects in late nineteenth century). 
35. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 196. 
36. DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995, at 54-56 (2004). 
37. Day, supra note 34, at 65.  Indeed, Henry, Emmanuel, and Mayer Lehman began in 
the informal immigrant banking world before founding Lehman Brothers, as did A.P. 
Giannini, the founder of Bank of America.  Id. at 77. 
38. JARED N. DAY, URBAN CASTLES 40 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1999).  One 1920 
federal report observed that ―real estate, first and second mortgages, and speculative securities 
were favored forms of investment.  Such holdings are almost uniformly the heaviest assets of 
the [immigrant] banker.‖  Id. at 40-41; see LOUIS WINNICK, RENTAL HOUSING: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 159 (1958). 
Frequently the small investor of past decades was a modest businessman or even a 
worker, often of foreign heritage, who regarded the purchase of a new residential 
property from his lifetime savings as providing not only a place to live, but also 
added personal status, a retirement income, and, with luck and rising prices, an 
estate for his children. 
Id.; STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 41 (―Many of the smaller landlords are first-generation 
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traditional lenders, immigrant lenders became ―critical sources of capital 
for local real estate investment.‖39 
Starting around World War I, the role of the immigrant lender in 
multifamily investment began to be displaced by competition from 
insurance and title companies, as well as other lenders.
40
  And over the 
course of the Great Depression, with its concomitant wave of 
foreclosures, many landlords lost their buildings.
41
  These trends 
initiated the professionalization of the multifamily real-estate industry, 
as many individual owners were shaken out, one way or another.
42
  This 
trend continued in the Post-War period, accompanied by more and more 
government involvement in multifamily finance.
43
 
Another significant ownership trend developed in the 1960s, 
whereby many African Americans purchased central-city, multifamily 
properties and used the housing for residential as well as income 
purposes.
44
  This trend was accompanied by the widespread 
abandonment of central-city housing by many absentee owners in the 
1960s and 1970s as buildings stopped producing sufficient income even 
to cover the basic costs of taxes and utilities, let alone insurance, 
financing, and maintenance expenses.
45
  As many cities became unstable 
in the 1960s, private lenders became scarce in the multifamily market.
46
  
 
Americans . . . .‖). 
39. DAY, supra note 38, at 41 (―[E]vidence suggests that the overall volume of 
[immigrant lenders‘] economic activity may have been staggering.‖). 
40. Id. (noting that regulation drove out some immigrant lenders); see Donald S. 
Bradley et al., Financing Multifamily Properties: A Play with New Actors and New Lines, 4 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 5, 11 (1998) (discussing the developing role of insurers 
and other new players in the multifamily mortgage market). 
41. DAY, supra note 38, at 176-177. 
42. Id.  Louis Winnick noted that one estimate in the 1950s found that ―the proportion 
of apartment mortgage debt held by institutional lenders rose from about 50 [percent] at the 
end of the twenties to 80 [percent] in the mid-fifties.‖  WINNICK, supra note 38, at 160. 
43. See MORTON, supra note 10, at 48-70 (providing detailed history of growth and 
structure of lending industry through early 1950s); WINNICK, supra note 38, at 155. 
44. STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 97. 
45. See, e.g., STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 269-352 (studying 
abandonment in Newark); THE NEW YORK CITY RAND INSTITUTE, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW 
YORK CITY 9-11 (Ira S. Lowry ed., 1970) [hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK 
CITY]; David J. Reiss, Housing Abandonment and New York City’s Response, 22 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 783 (1996).  The abandonment crisis was most severe in the East, as broad 
demographic changes drove jobs and people to other parts of the country.  See Harold L. 
Bunce & Sue G. Neal, Trends in City Conditions During the 1970s: A Survey of Demographic 
and Socioeconomic Changes, 14 PUBLIUS 7, 8-10 (1984). 
46. See, e.g., STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 197 (―In Baltimore, too, the absence of 
mortgage capital is a critical factor in the declining inner-city market . . . .‖); STERNLIEB & 
BURCHELL, supra note 7, at xxv (―Primary lenders in urban areas—commercial and mutual 
savings banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and even individuals—are 
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Even after cities recovered from the abandonment crisis, the multifamily 
market continued with a cycle of booms and busts—most notably the 
late-1980s to early-1990s bust and the late-1990s and early-2000s 
boom—followed by the bust in which we now find ourselves.47 
Historically, the available private-sector lending was unattractive 
from the multi-unit landlord‘s perspective.48  Throughout much of the 
twentieth century, private multifamily mortgages had been short term, 
requiring a borrower to refinance frequently and face the risk that the 
interest-rate environment might become unfavorable.
49
  Such an unstable 
lending environment can lead to a depressed real-estate market as 
owners lose faith in their ability to sell their property because potential 
buyers are unable to arrange for financing.
50
 
Owners of smaller multifamily properties seem to find their 
financing options even less attractive, as seen from the fact that such 
buildings are mortgaged less often than larger multifamily properties.
51
  
Mortgages secured by smaller properties also tend to have higher interest 
 
getting out of the inner city mortgage lending business.  They are replaced by mortgage 
companies which deal almost exclusively in insured loans.‖); see also RENTAL HOUSING IN 
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 45, at 9 (―[I]nstitutional investors are, as rapidly as possible, 
reducing their portfolios of controlled housing and of housing in deteriorated 
neighborhoods.‖). 
47. Lawrence Goldberg & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Multifamily Mortgage Credit Risk: 
Lessons from Recent History, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 93, 95 (1998) (discussing 
tax and accounting aspects of booms and busts of 1980s-2000s); Segal, supra note 23, at 178 
(discussing the 1980s and 1990s bust); Prabha Natarajan, Real-Estate Finance: Apartments 
Try to Stay Afloat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, at C11 (reporting on rising mortgage defaults 
for multifamily properties). 
48. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 237.  The authors note, 
The availability of institutional financing is one of the major determinants of the 
health and vitality of the real estate market.  If the banks, savings and loan 
companies, insurance companies, and the like are willing to lend in an area, then 
owners can have confidence that their investments in properties are redeemable 
through ultimate resale or remortgaging. 
Id. 
49. GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUSING 89 
(1981). 
50. Id. at 87-89. 
51. Segal, supra note 23, at 179-80 (noting that owners of smaller buildings are more 
likely to rely on relational financing from depository institutions).  The lower rate of 
mortgages for smaller buildings may also be explained in part by the fact that smaller 
buildings are easier to buy in an all-cash transaction and that smaller mortgages can be paid in 
full more easily.  Finally, it is unclear what the socially optimal rate of financing for 
multifamily buildings is, so it may or may not be that the lower proportion of mortgages for 
smaller buildings is actually undesirable.  That being said, many of the commentators 
discussed herein take the position that the small multifamily sector has a more difficult time 
obtaining financing than other sectors of the mortgage market. 
REISS 10 6/25/2010  12:16 PM 
12 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:nnn 
rates,
52
 and they have adjustable interest rates more frequently than 
mortgages secured by larger properties; this exposes them to interest-rate 
risk.
53
 
One major reason for the different mortgage terms for small and 
large properties is that the underwriting of any commercial mortgage is 
associated with significant fixed costs.
54
  These underwriting costs, 
payable to third-party providers, can exceed $10,000 and typically 
include charges for appraisals, environmental reviews, and attorney 
certifications.
55
  Because the small-apartment-building lender has to 
recoup those costs from a smaller principal base, there will be higher 
upfront fees or a higher interest rate, which will allow the lender to 
amortize those fixed costs over time.
56
 
As a result of the unattractive terms available in the private, 
multifamily mortgage market generally, the government sector has 
sought to expand financing options.
57
  Various government programs 
 
52. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13.  Small multifamily properties also tend to pay 
significantly higher mortgage rates.  Bradley, supra note 31, at 502 (estimating that rates on 
small properties are about 100 basis points higher than rates on large developments); see also 
Drew Schneider & James Follain, A New Initiative in the Federal Housing Administration’s 
Office of Multifamily Housing Programs: An Assessment of Small Projects Processing, 4 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 43, 49 (1998) (noting that, in some cases, smaller 
multifamily mortgages are as much as 300 basis points higher). 
53. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13-14.  Interest-rate risk is the risk that the payments a 
company owes on short-term debt that funds purchases become mismatched with the interest 
payments it receives in turn from its long-term investments.  David Reiss, The Federal 
Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam 
Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2008). 
54. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50; see also HERBERT, supra note 20, at 
iv (arguing that higher interest rates reflect the need to amortize fixed costs over the life of the 
loan, the reduced competition in the market segment, and the lack of sophistication of the 
borrowers in that segment).  Commercial mortgage underwriting primarily focuses on the 
ability of the property to cover its monthly expenses and its monthly mortgage expenses in 
particular.  By way of contrast, residential mortgage underwriting focuses on whether the 
borrower has the capacity to repay the loan. 
A recent study of community bank underwriting suggests that the use of consumer credit 
scores for owners of small businesses—as opposed to reliance on best estimates of the 
creditworthiness of the small business itself—may prove a way to expand credit without 
increasing credit risk.  See Allen N. Berger et al., The Surprising Use of Credit Scoring in 
Small Business Lending by Community Banks and the Attendant Effects on Credit Availability 
and Risk 1-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2009-9, 2009), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0909.pdf. 
55. See HERBERT, supra note 20, at 15-16. 
56. See Bradley et al., supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the fixed costs of loan review 
―increase as a percentage of loan balance as loan size decreases‖). 
57. See STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 49, at 91 (noting that the government sector 
had become a dominant lender in the multifamily sector even though it imposes some terms 
that landlords find onerous). 
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stepped in to provide more stable lending to such borrowers, including 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as state- and 
government-sponsored enterprise programs.
58
  Because of the high fixed 
costs associated with originating and servicing such loans, however, 
these government programs faced similar constraints as private lenders.  
As a result, these multifamily mortgage programs also have historically 
poorly served the smaller multifamily subsector. 
A variety of FHA programs provided mortgages, either directly or 
indirectly, for multifamily properties.
59
  The market penetration of these 
programs has waxed and waned with changes in the market and the 
political environment.
60
  FHA programs, however, have been frequently 
criticized for their high interest rates, slow approval processes, overly 
strict underwriting criteria, and relatively short (five-year) terms.
61
  Over 
time, the FHA has also tended to provide financing for larger buildings 
as well, in part because of the efficiencies presented by larger projects.
62
  
This was compounded by the fact that owners of smaller properties were 
often less likely to know about and access such government programs 
because of lack of knowledge about, experience with, and expertise with 
 
58. See id. at 89-91. 
59. The FHA provides for mortgages indirectly by offering mortgage insurance to 
lenders that insures against losses incurred when borrowers default.  ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, 
HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (2006) (discussing various FHA programs); 
EDWARD J. SZYMANOSKI & SUSAN J. DONAHUE, DO FHA MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDE AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SERVE UNDERSERVED 
AREAS? 6 (1999); U.S. Dep‘t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Descriptions of Multifamily Programs, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfh/progdesc/progdesc.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing 
FHA mortgage insurance origination programs). 
60. Vandell, supra note 10, at 323 (noting that ―[b]y 1993, FHA was virtually out of the 
multifamily business, making up only 6 percent of multifamily starts‖). 
61. See, e.g., STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 186-87, 192-96; WINNICK, supra note 38, at 
171; Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 152-53 (discussing the ―litany of problems‖ 
with the FHA).  The FHA responds to these criticisms on its website.  FHA Website, 
Dispelling Common Myths About Participating with FHA (on file with author).  For a history 
of the early FHA, seen from a planning perspective, see MARK A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE 
COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND 
PLANNING 141-158 (1987). 
62. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that fixed costs could be spread over 
more units in larger buildings); Segal, supra note 23, at 189 (noting that the proportion of 
small-multifamily mortgages insured by the FHA fell from 39.4% in 1989 to 1.9% in 2002).  
In 1997, the FHA announced its Small Projects Processing Program, which was intended to 
reach the small-project market that had been marginalized in earlier FHA programs.  Id.; see 
also Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 48 (finding that the FHA‘s standard multifamily 
programs ―are prohibitive for financing small projects‖).  Vandell does note, however, that the 
FHA has focused on smaller projects at various times in its history.  Vandell, supra note 10, at 
324 (noting that FHA‘s post-war focus was on smaller projects). 
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them.
63
 
Many states have housing finance agencies that provide low-
interest loans and long terms in exchange for caps on rents.
64
  However, 
these programs also tend to favor larger projects, because, again, of the 
fixed costs associated with them.
65
  Other state-government programs 
directed at property owners are also less often accessed by owners of 
smaller multifamily properties.
66
 
The federal government has not taken a strong lead in supporting 
small multifamily finance as compared to other mortgage subsectors.
67
  
The Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly known as 
―Fannie Mae‖) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(commonly known as ―Freddie Mac‖), the two government-sponsored 
enterprises that dominate the conforming residential (owner-occupied) 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market, first entered the 
multifamily market in a significant way in the 1990s.
68
  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have, however, had limited exposure to the small 
multifamily sector, tending to put their resources in the large multifamily 
sector.
69
  This is partly because their underwriting and servicing 
 
63. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189. 
64. See National Council of State Housing Agencies, HFA Directory, 
http://www.ncsha.org/housing-help (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). 
65. Schnare, supra note 22, at 21-22 (citing Bradley, supra note 31); see also JUSTIN 
COOPER, MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING: FINANCING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 21 (2003) 
(noting that because the costs of offering tax-exempt bonds ―to the public are largely fixed, 
but project sizes and costs vary widely, some transactions are too small to justify the cost of a 
public offering‖). 
66. Bradley, supra note 31, at 487. 
67. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at iv.  For a 
list of federal multifamily finance programs, see SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 19, at 160.  In a 
1992 study prepared for HUD, researchers found that ten percent of all units in HUD-insured 
multifamily housing properties were in buildings with fewer than fifty units.  JAMES E. 
WALLACE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE HUD-INSURED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING STOCK 2-4 
(1992). 
68. See generally DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33. 
69. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4; see also 
Frank E. Nothaft & James L. Freund, The Evolution of Securitization in Multifamily Mortgage 
Markets and Its Effect on Lending Rates, 25 J. REAL EST. RES. 91, 91-92 (2003) (describing 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac‘s limited exposure to multifamily sectors, which ―reflected the 
nature of the underlying multifamily loans: mortgage contracts were not standardized, the 
collateral rental properties were heterogeneous and the geographic concentration of properties 
made multifamily lending a more risky undertaking‖).  As the Joint Center notes, Fannie and 
Freddie typically ―only increased their focus on financing smaller (5-49 unit) multifamily 
rental properties temporarily when‖ doing so helped them meet the affordable housing goals 
set for them by Congress.  MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, 
at 7; see KIMBERLY BURNETT & LINDA B. FOSBURG, STUDY OF THE MULTIFAMILY 
UNDERWRITING AND THE GSES‘ ROLE IN THE MULTIFAMILY MARKET: EXPANDED VERSION, 
at x-xi (2001) (noting that the ―GSEs‘ multifamily purchases do not appear to be contributing 
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standards often are uneconomical or too stringent for smaller buildings 
and their owners.
70
 
Starting in the early 1990s, a vibrant, private, secondary mortgage 
market for multifamily housing mortgages also developed.
71
  At that 
time, the Wall Street firms developed so-called ―private-label‖ CMBS 
which included multifamily mortgages.
72
  At the peak of the global 
CMBS market in 2007, there was nearly $309 billion in CMBS issued, 
of which almost $49 billion, or sixteen percent, was comprised of 
multifamily mortgages.
73
 
Securitization works best when the underlying assets are similar 
because such similarity reduces due diligence and other costs.
74
  One of 
the main limitations of the multifamily CMBS market is that the 
underlying mortgages are not uniform, particularly in the case of smaller 
properties.
75
  This increases the transaction costs for all parties who must 
deal with them.
76
  Furthermore, owners of small properties often do not 
keep the kind of records that investors would require in order to invest in 
such properties, even at the mortgage-backed pool level.
77
 
 
consistently to the mitigation of excessive cost of mortgage financing facing small properties 
with five to 50 units,‖ but also noting that HUD had implemented an incentive for the GSEs to 
become more active in this segment); see also HUD‘s Regulation of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044, 65,045 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81 
(2009)) (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ―have been much less active in purchasing 
mortgages in markets where there is a need for additional financing to address persistent 
housing needs including financing for small multifamily rental properties, manufactured 
housing, single family owner-occupied rental properties, seasoned affordable housing 
mortgages, and older housing in need of rehabilitation‖). 
70. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49. 
71. See AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY, 
supra note 3, at 14; DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33. 
72. Kent W. Colton & Kate Collignon, Multifamily Rental Housing in the 21
st
 Century 
64 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W01-1, 2001), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/colton_w01-1.pdf. 
73. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008 (2008), 
available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=198.  Global Multifamily CMBS 
issuance grew from $9.9 billion in 2000.  COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS 
ISSUANCE IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=170.  It has 
since fallen to $2.9 billion in 2008 as a result of the credit crisis.  See supra, GLOBAL CMBS 
ISSUANCE IN 2008. 
74. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home 
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (―Without a standardized mortgage document and uniform 
lending techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten off the ground.‖). 
75. THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; DiPasquale & 
Cummings, supra note 33, at 97. 
76. DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97. 
77. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2. 
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The proportion of multifamily mortgages that had been securitized 
since the early 1990s has grown steadily as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
and the private-label sector has gained more experience with the CMBS 
market.
78
  In 1986, less than ten percent of multifamily mortgages were 
either held or securitized through the activities of government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, federal agencies 
like Ginnie Mae, and private securities issuers.
79
  Just ten years later, in 
1996, this number had jumped to twenty-three percent.
80
  And in 2006, 
prior to the credit crisis, roughly forty-five percent of multifamily 
mortgages were sold into the secondary mortgage market.
81
 
However, the increase in securitization was concentrated in 
mortgages secured by large properties.
82
  Small multifamily mortgages 
 
78. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY, 
supra note 3, at 14 (―Along with increased standardization of underwriting criteria and loan 
documentation, these trends created a larger, more stable, and less expensive source of capital 
for rental property owners and developers, while also providing greater diversification for 
investors.‖). 
79. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at 87 tbl.L.219 
[hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS 1985-1994], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf.  The calculations 
in this paragraph take into account the sum of outstanding multifamily residential mortgage 
debt attributed to ―Government-sponsored enterprises,‖ ―Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage 
pools,‖ and ―ABS issuers,‖ as compared to the ―Total Liabilities‖ of multifamily residential 
mortgage debt. 
80. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, at 87 tbl.L.219, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1995-2004.pdf. 
81. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2008, at 87 tbls.L.218 & 
L.219 [hereinafter FLOW OF FUNDS 2005-2008], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2008.pdf.  By way of 
contrast, sixty percent of mortgages on one- to four-family properties were sold into the 
secondary mortgage market in 2006.  Id.  This increase in securitization was, of course, at the 
expense of traditional players in the commercial mortgage market: the portion of multifamily 
mortgages held by commercial banks, savings institutions, and life insurance companies 
dropped from sixty-two percent in 1986, FLOW OF FUNDS 1985-1994, supra note 79, at 87 
tbl.L219, to forty percent in 2006, FLOW OF FUNDS 2005-2008, supra, at 87 tbl.L.219. 
82. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY, 
supra note 3, at 14.  The report notes, 
[A] dual mortgage delivery system began to emerge. Individuals and investors 
seeking to purchase, rehabilitate, or build smaller rental properties were increasingly 
served by a distinctly different set of mortgage products, provided by a distinctly 
different set of lenders, than those financing larger rental properties.  The Survey of 
Residential Finance documents [show] that by 2001, some 86 percent of all 
apartment properties with 50 or more units had a mortgage, and as many as 65 
percent of these properties had a level-payment, fixed-rate loan. In contrast, only 58 
percent of five- to nine-unit apartment buildings had a mortgage, and just a third had 
level-payment, fixed-rate mortgages. 
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made up significantly less than ten percent of total securitized 
multifamily volume in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
83
  Smaller loans 
and loans for properties with five to forty-nine units mostly bypass the 
secondary market altogether and remain in the domain of bank and thrift 
portfolio lenders.
84
 
In sum, the small multifamily subsector remains comparatively 
underserved in the secondary mortgage market as well as in the primary 
mortgage market.
85
  As a result, there is evidence that a ―credit gap‖ has 
existed in parts of the multifamily mortgage market, particularly in the 
five- to forty-nine-unit property sector.
86
  The question remains: should 
the government intervene to shrink that gap? 
 
Id. 
83. Segal, supra note 23, at 191.  Christopher Herbert, writing in 2001, noted that only 
1.8% of loans in CMBS consisted of small loans.  HERBERT, supra note 20, at 14.  Herbert‘s 
research suggests that the CMBS market does not offer lower interest rates; rather, it offers 
fixed-rate financing where depositories typically offer adjustable-rate financing.  Id. at vi.  
Even though Fannie and Freddie‘s exposure to this submarket is small, it is larger than that of 
private label CMBS players.  HERBERT, supra note 20, at vii.  Other actors play a significant 
role in financing multifamily housing:  for instance, pension funds and life insurance 
companies typically finance luxury multifamily developments.  MEETING MULTIFAMILY 
HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4.  Mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts also 
invest in multifamily projects.  SCHMITZ, MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 156; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 345 (discussing limited role 
of mortgage REITs in multifamily finance).  I have not been able to find more up-to-date data 
for small multifamily securitization rates. 
84. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION‘S HOUSING 24 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2004)], 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (noting that in 
1999, ―more than half of all multifamily loans financed by banks and thrifts had balances of 
$1 million or less, compared with about 15 percent of the multifamily loans financed by‖ 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  HUD‘s 1996 Property Owners and Managers Survey reveals 
that depositories fund about seventy percent of mortgages for buildings with fewer than fifty 
units versus forty-five percent of properties with one hundred or more units.  Herbert, supra 
note 20, at 13; see also THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2004), supra, at 24 (noting 
that because of the history of the secondary mortgage market, two- to four-unit properties are 
more readily securitized because they are grouped with single-family homes in the residential 
mortgage market and are securitized as part of residential, mortgage-backed securities).  
Although underwriting costs for small properties are proportionately higher, it appears that 
such properties are ―comparable to larger multifamily properties in historical loan 
performance.‖  Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49. 
85. See HUD‘s Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044, 
65,050 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81) (―There is evidence that the aging stocks 
of single family rental properties and small multifamily properties with 5-50 units, which play 
a key role in lower-income housing, have experienced difficulties in obtaining financing.‖). 
86. William Segal & Edward J. Szymanoski, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Multifamily Mortgage Market, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 59, 65 (1998). 
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III. THE CASE FOR SUBSIDIZING LANDLORDS OF SMALL PROPERTIES 
HAS NOT BEEN MADE 
As leading housing scholar Stegman notes, ‗―it is obvious that the 
substantial owner of slum real estate is not in business for altruistic 
purposes‘ . . . but since when is altruism a prerequisite for progress?‖87  
Stegman and Sternlieb argue that it may benefit society to help wealth-
maximizing small-apartment-building owners in order to ultimately 
assist low- and moderate-income tenants.
88
 
While I do not disagree with this general proposition, I believe that 
we should be certain that any aid given to landlords will actually be 
passed on in large part to their tenants, whether through lower rents or 
improved conditions.  As such, I question the extent to which the 
government should implement affordable housing initiatives by 
subsidizing small-apartment-building owners.  This question is of 
pressing importance because leading housing scholars believe that small 
multifamily mortgages should in fact be subsidized. 
Leading housing scholars have advocated for small multifamily 
mortgage subsidies for over forty years.  Michael Stegman has called for 
decreased costs for small-property owners, even while acknowledging 
that there ―is something distasteful about trying to rally support for a 
group of property owners who have been considered the natural enemy 
of liberal housing reformers ever since the industrial revolution.‖89  
More recently, the Joint Center, along with affiliated researchers, has 
called for Congress to expend public funds to develop new financing 
tools, including subsidies, for small, privately-owned apartment 
buildings.
90
 
 
87. Stegman, supra note 7, at 423 (quoting STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 139). 
88. See generally STERNLIEB, supra note 1; Stegman, supra note 7. 
89. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. 
90. See, e.g., AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL 
POLICY, supra note 3, at 20.  For example, 
Since developing new affordable rental housing remains difficult without steep 
subsidy, preserving whatever low-cost units remain should be an urgent priority.  
The success of preservation efforts depends in large measure on the willingness of 
Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to renew expiring project-based contracts 
and fund additional efforts to slow the loss of privately owned low-cost rentals. 
Id.; see William Apgar, Rethinking Rental Housing: Expanding the Ability of Rental Housing 
to Serve as a Pathway to Economic and Social Opportunity 55 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of 
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-11, 2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf (fleshing out a proposal for a 
trust that ―could combine private capital with federal, state and local resources, while at the 
same time reducing costs associated with obtaining subsidies on a project-by-project basis‖); 
Revisiting Rental Housing Policy, supra note 17, at 16 (―Some owners who are interested in 
continuing to operate their properties as low-cost housing will need help with capital needs; 
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The Joint Center‘s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan have 
presented perhaps the most well-developed subsidy proposal to date.
91
  
They advocate that the federal government sponsor a ―small Real Estate 
Investment Trust (S-REIT) that would aggregate ownership of older, 
smaller multifamily properties with low or modest rents‖ and act as a 
conduit for federal subsidies.
92
  From this investment vehicle, small-
multifamily-property owners would receive the following benefits: they 
would incur no capital gains tax on exchanging their property for a 
proportionate (and liquid) interest in the S-REIT; they would gain access 
to credit at a lower price by means of the S-REIT‘s tax-exempt bond 
issuing capability; and properties managed by the trust would be exempt 
from recording taxes and would be eligible for local tax abatements.
93
  
Individually, each of these benefits would confer a significant advantage 
over owners of comparable properties; taken collectively, these benefits 
represent a substantial subsidy channeled directly to owners of small 
multifamily buildings who choose to participate in an S-REIT. 
There are two main rationales for subsidizing small-building 
landlords.  First, they provide housing to the neediest tenants: low- and 
moderate-income families who are not fortunate enough to have 
obtained subsidized apartments.  Second, the multifamily mortgage 
market is subject to market failures that make government intervention 
appropriate.  I will assess these two rationales in turn. 
A. The Affordability Rationale 
Housing economist John Quigley writes, 
―Affordability‖ is clearly the most compelling rationale for 
polices [sic] subsidizing rental housing.  The high cost of rental 
 
other properties may need to be purchased to preserve affordability.  While much is known 
about ways to preserve subsidized developments, preservation strategies for the unassisted 
stock have received little attention‖); Stegman, supra note 7, at 420.  Shaun Donovan, now the 
Secretary of HUD, has proposed subsidizing the cost of underwriting, servicing, and 
securitization for small multifamily buildings.  Shaun Donovan, Background Paper on Market 
Rate Multifamily Rental Housing 21 (Millennial Hous. Comm‘n, Fin. Task Force, 2002), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/papers/mrmf.doc.  This proposal rests, it appears, on the 
assumption that such a subsidy would be a relatively efficient way to increase the supply of 
affordable housing.  See Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. 
91. Despite the repeated refrain for new financing alternatives and subsidies by 
affordable-housing advocates like the Joint Center, there is surprisingly little in concrete 
proposals as to how to implement policies directing subsidies to small-building owners. 
92. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2.  The Community Preservation Corporation 
(CPC) also proposed a model of MBS that was intended to address the needs of smaller (six to 
twelve) unit buildings.  Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 168-172 (evaluating the CPC 
proposal). 
93. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
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housing, relative to the ability of low-income households to pay for 
housing, means that these households have few resources left over 
for expenditures on other goods—food, clothing, medicine—which 
are also necessities.
94
 
Quigley‘s position applies to all affordable housing subsidies.  To 
make the case that it applies with special force to subsidies directed at 
for-profit owners of small apartment buildings, one must argue that such 
actors are better at delivering affordable housing to at least some 
category of households than other actors. 
And, indeed, that argument does have some merit.  For instance, if 
other providers of affordable housing systematically exclude some low-
income households, a case may be made that for-profit owners of small 
apartment buildings do play a socially beneficial role as landlords of last 
resort.  There is evidence that some affordable housing providers have a 
history of behaving in just this way.  Public housing authorities have at 
various times in their history effectively screened ―out any prospective 
tenant family who for any reason might act irresponsibly or fail to 
adequately care for its government-owned housing unit.‖95  Michael 
 
94. John M. Quigley, Just Suppose: Housing Subsidies for Low-Income Renters 13 
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-9, 2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07-
9_quigley.pdf, and reprinted in REVISITING RENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, 
AND PRIORITIES 300 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); see Robert C. 
Ellickson, The Mediocrity of Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing Projects 3 
(Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Paper 
No. 360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 (―Most housing experts agree 
that the chief challenge today is not how to improve the quality of American dwellings, but 
how to make what‘s available more affordable to households on a tight budget.‖); Schnare, 
supra note 22, at 27 (―Given the relatively low incomes of this nation‘s renters—and the 
relatively high costs of operating and maintaining units—there is a real and unmet need for 
rental subsidies.‖); see also Roger Starr, Private Ventures in Slum Building Rehabilitation for 
Low-Income Families, 24 J. HOUSING 32 (1967).  Starr notes that 
it is clear that rehabilitation of old law tenements for low income families cannot be 
done profitably without heavy subsidization—above and beyond low interest, long 
term mortgages, and tax abatements.  What seems to be needed are either rent 
supplements, which would permit realistic rent levels, or an initial capital grant 
which would help keep rents at a level that tenants could afford out of their own 
earnings. 
Id., quoted in Stegman, supra note 7, at 423; WINNICK, supra note 38, at 171 (―The problems 
and perplexities of rental housing demonstrate that some form of government assistance has 
been—and still is—an inescapable requirement for an adequate volume of new private 
investment in rental housing . . . .‖). 
95. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420; SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 105 (noting that 
during the early days of public housing, ―[m]anagers conducted home visits to most applicants 
to see whether their households were sufficiently orderly to qualify for public housing,‖ and 
that ―[m]anagers were also not shy about evicting unruly tenants or tenants who failed to keep 
their homes up to an acceptable standard of tidiness‖); Michael H. Schill & Susan W. 
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Stegman therefore argues that it ―rests with the private landlord to 
provide such families with housing.‖96  While Stegman wrote this over 
forty years ago, his argument can hold true for federally assisted housing 
providers today.
97
 
This state of affairs is further exacerbated by the long-term 
disinvestment in the nation‘s stock of subsidized affordable housing.  
Since the 1980s, 
the pace of government spending in general has slowed; the 
problems in large-scale public housing projects are proving 
intractable; the new subsidized alternative—small-scale, scattered-
site, mixed-income projects—provides housing for very few families 
 
Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in 
Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1995) (―In the early years of the [public 
housing] program, [Public Housing Authorities] had enormous latitude in admission and 
eviction decisions.  This freedom permitted [the housing authorities] to screen out ‗problem‘ 
tenants and quickly evict those who created difficulties.‖); see also NICHOLAS DAGEN 
BLOOM, PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 
(2009) (noting that the level of scrutiny applied to public-housing applicants waxed and 
waned over time and among jurisdictions). 
96. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. 
97. ―Federally assisted housing‖ includes public-housing projects, Section-8 tenant-
based rent vouchers, as well as housing financed, insured, constructed, and substantially 
rehabilitated via federal funding.  42 U.S.C. § 13641(2) (2006).  By statute, providers of 
federally assisted housing are required to screen prospective tenants and may reject 
households where any member is using illegal drugs, abusing alcohol, or is engaging in any 
―criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other residents.‖  42 U.S.C. § 13661; see also 24 C.F.R. § 
960.203 (2009).  Similarly, federal law provides for the termination of assistance where a 
household member is found to be using drugs or abusing alcohol.  42 U.S.C. § 13662.  In both 
screening and termination decisions, what constitutes a disqualifying violation is left to the 
discretion of the housing provider.  Id.  This blanket authority has prompted one public-
interest lawyer to warn that the greatest concern for advocates representing poor clients is 
―overzealous officials‖ barring families with even minor criminal histories, despite the 
absence of a conviction or even an arrest.  John J. Ammann, Housing out the Poor, 19 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 318 (2000).  Further, the aggressive implementation of such ―One 
Strike‖ policies to disqualify federal housing applicants has been incentivized by HUD.  
Funding bonuses and freedom from federal oversight is linked, in part, to the number of 
applicants a housing authority has rejected in accordance with the ―One Strike‖ initiative.  See 
24 C.F.R. § 902.71 (laying out incentives for housing authorities); OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN 
HOUS., U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., ―ONE STRIKE AND YOU‘RE OUT‖ POLICY IN 
PUBLIC HOUSING (attachment to Notice No. 96-16, Apr. 12, 1996), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/notices/pih/files/96-16PIHN.doc (exhorting housing 
authorities to aggressively implement ―One Strike‖ criteria in return for performance 
incentives). 
Compounding the difficulties faced by tenants of federally assisted housing, existing law 
also empowers housing providers to disqualify entire households for the acts of a single 
member, even where the family is ignorant of the offending conduct.  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6); 
see HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (affirming a public-housing operator‘s broad 
authority to conduct such ―no-fault‖ evictions under the statute). 
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at an exorbitant cost. It has become apparent to most that the 
government simply cannot replace the private sector in the housing 
market.  The regulatory environment needs to reflect this new policy 
awareness and encourage, or at least not discourage, private rental 
housing ownership.
98
 
A final important factor contributing to the problem of affordability 
is that a significant amount of rental housing is being demolished or 
permanently taken out of service; this is particularly true in distressed 
communities where the need for affordable housing is often the greatest, 
but rings true in gentrifying communities as well.
99
 
With possible ―skimming‖ of the best tenants by government and 
 
98. Schloming & Schloming, supra note 12, at 30; see RICHARD HILTON & CHARLES 
HANSON, EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET PROGRAM 1 (2004) (noting that from the 
mid-1960s through the mid-1980s ―the Federal Government committed substantial resources 
for project-based rental assistance in new or substantially rehabilitated multifamily (5 units or 
more) properties for low- or moderate-income families,‖ and that ―[t]hese properties were 
subsidized through a variety of different programs, but they were all provided with long-term 
subsidies for specific rental units owned by private landlords‖); SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 
34-37 (charting decrease in federal assistance for affordable housing).  It should be noted that 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit has financed more than two million units of affordable 
housing since 1987.  See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, 
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR BANKS 1 (2008), available at www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-10a.pdf.  While this is 
a great achievement, it does not come close to meeting the need for affordable housing.  See 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 18-37 (summarizing serious affordability and housing condition 
issues in rental-housing stock).  And despite its many successes, the recent economic 
downturn has destabilized the market for Low-Income Housing Tax credits.  Ruth Simon et 
al., Millions for Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2008, at C12 (―Demand for tax credits 
has waned among banks and financial giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because they 
haven't been registering profits.‖).  One could argue that a benefit of the Joint Center‘s 
proposal is that, unlike Low-Income Housing Tax credits that cannot function well in a 
contracting economy, the S-REIT would continue to operate.  However, outside of a dire 
recession, this is much less of a concern and should not trump considerations of how subsidies 
perform under more normal circumstances. 
99. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note 12, at 
22.  The report describes the problem of smaller properties at risk for removal: 
Over the ten years beginning in 1993, an estimated 2.3 million rental units (6 
percent) were demolished or otherwise permanently removed from the inventory.  
Over half of these rentals were in older (built before 1960) one- to four-family 
buildings located in the nation‘s most distressed neighborhoods . . . . As might be 
expected, loss rates are higher for properties with such additional risk factors as low 
rent, long-term vacancies, and structural deficiencies.  For older, smaller 
multifamily units, these added risk factors push the loss rate to 13 percent.  
Combining all the risk factors, including structural inadequacy, pushes the loss rate 
to over 20 percent. 
Id.  In gentrifying communities, rental housing may be taken out of service in order to convert 
it to condominiums.  See generally Hans Lind & Anders Hellström, Gentrification—An 
Overview of the Literature (Div. of Bldg. & Real Estate Econ., Working Paper No. 38, 2003), 
available at http://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.19799!38.pdf. 
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not-for-profit housing providers, the long-term reduction in government-
supported housing, and the material reduction in the stock of affordable 
housing, low- and moderate-income families who did not get a 
subsidized apartment have to fend for themselves in the private housing 
market.  As a result of these long-term trends, the Joint Center has 
sought to redirect some of the focus of the housing preservation debate 
from subsidized housing to ―the fate of the privately owned, 
unsubsidized rental stock that serves the vast majority of low-income 
renter households.‖100  Because financing costs are typically the biggest 
expense for multifamily properties, ―issues related to the costs and 
availability of mortgage funds have important implications for the 
overall affordability of rental housing.‖101 
While the affordability problem is uncontroversial and well 
documented, it is unclear that the best solution for it is to reduce the 
financing costs of these landlords of last resort.  Before undertaking the 
Joint Center approach, one must be confident that landlords will pass on 
these savings to their tenants and reverse the trend of shrinking the 
affordable housing stock.  In other words, if the benefits of the reduction 
in landlord financing costs are intended to trickle down to tenants, one 
should be certain as to its rate of flow.
102
 
James Follain and Edward Szymanoski challenge responses to the 
affordability problem like that of the Joint Center: ―[I]t is wise to 
consider the relative importance of multifamily mortgage credit subsidy 
programs in an overall strategy to improve the delivery of housing 
services to low-income households.‖103  They argue that, for a variety of 
reasons, ―[t]hese subsidy programs should not rank very high.‖104 
First, they argue that there is insufficient empirical evidence to 
support the argument for supply-side subsidies.
105
  Second, they argue 
that an unacceptable portion of the subsidy flows to the housing 
providers and related industries.
106
  Third, they argue that many supply-
 
100. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note 12, at 
21-22 (also noting that this ―affordable inventory consists primarily of single-family and small 
multifamily units‖). 
101. Schnare, supra note 22, at 4. 
102. Cf. WINNICK, supra note 38, at 172 (noting that indirect government aids for rental 
housing ―must be channeled through the hands of an intermediary—the private investor‖ and 
that ―[c]onstant vigilance and strict regulation are required to insure that benefits will not be 
absorbed before they reach the intended beneficiary‖). 
103. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 173. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 174. 
106. Id. 
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side subsidies are subject to improper political interference.
107
 
Follain clearly outlines the argument against a ―trickle down,‖ 
supply-side subsidized multifamily mortgage policy, based on a 
fundamental question: what is the price elasticity of the housing 
supply?
108
  If the housing supply is elastic, then tenants may benefit from 
reductions in the cost of providing the housing.
109
  But if it is inelastic, 
―the primary beneficiaries of such programs are likely to be builders, 
investors, and other supply-side agents.‖110  This is because reducing 
production costs for an inelastic supply should not result in price 
reductions—only an elastic and increasing supply would have such a 
result.
111
  As the housing economics literature has not yet determined 
whether the housing supply is elastic, it is dangerous to implement 
public policy based on the assumption that it is.
112
 
After noting the limitations inherent in such supply-side, trickle-
down policies, Follain and Szymanoski close their argument by pointing 
to the existence of more efficient solutions to some of the problems that 
a mortgage finance subsidy is intended to address.
113
  One such solution, 
for instance, would be to pursue policies that directly benefit low- and 
moderate-income households and are targeted to reduce housing costs 
for tenants.  Section 8, tenant-based rent vouchers are the most well 
 
107. Id. (arguing that ―[d]emand-side programs are less prone to this type of abuse in 
competitive markets for rental housing, which seems to be the typical situation‖). 
108. Follain, supra note 10, at 543. 
109. Elasticity of housing supply depends in turn on a variety of local factors, including 
rent, zoning, land use, and building regulations. 
110. Follain, supra note 10, at 544.  See EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, 
RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 64-81 (2008), for a discussion of the extreme 
variability of elasticity among American housing submarkets that results from variations in 
local land use regulation. 
111. For example, if housing supply is elastic, developers would build more housing if 
it became profitable to do so as a result of decreased financing costs.  This is because 
financing costs are a major element of overall housing cost. 
112. Follain, supra note 10, at 544.  Of course there is a certain amount of waste in any 
subsidy that does not involve a direct income transfer.  If one were only choosing among 
producer subsidies, one must compare their comparative inefficiencies. 
113. Id.  Follain and Szymanoski suggest that 
the complexity of multifamily lending can be reduced by simplifying the rules and 
regulations surrounding nonprofit housing development organizations.  Local 
governments can also be encouraged to develop housing codes that are more 
accommodating to projects for low-income households. Another idea usually 
favored by economists is a well-structured demand-side voucher program that 
encourages recipients to search the market for good and affordable housing. This 
type of subsidy program is usually simpler to implement than subsidized lending 
programs and is more likely to be successful. 
Id.; see Ellickson, supra note 94 (comparing efficacy of vouchers to inclusionary programs). 
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known of such subsidies.
114
  One could achieve similar results by 
providing a tax credit for rent payments by low- and moderate-income 
families.  Ultimately, the concerns set forth by Follain and Szymanoski 
regarding multifamily mortgage subsidy programs in general must be 
addressed before a federal or state government should implement a new 
program of subsidized, multifamily mortgage finance for small buildings 
in particular. 
B. The Market Failure Rationale 
Follain and Szymanoski also explore ―market failure‖ as an 
alternate rationale for government intervention in the multifamily 
mortgage sector.
115
  In particular, they note that 
[i]t is difficult to make a case for government intervention in the 
multifamily mortgage market when using the standard model of 
market failure, given the efficiencies of modern financial markets.  
The case for intervention in the financial markets, if one is to be 
made, is more subtle and requires a model in which uncertainty 
about some future events—for example, mortgage defaults—is 
explicit.  Market failure in models with uncertainty is caused by two 
broad categories of factors in the credit markets: uninsurable risks 
and information costs.
116
 
The question, then, is whether the small multifamily mortgage 
market suffers from uncertainty because of uninsurable risks or 
information costs.  While researchers in the 1980s and 1990s found that 
 
114. See generally RICHARD HILTON ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET 
PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/M2MEva.pdf.  The 
authors note, 
In 1974, Congress enacted Section 8 ―Lower Income Rental Assistance‖ under the 
United States Housing Act, a program that could be either project-based or tenant-
based. Rather than providing a fixed subsidy, tenants would generally pay 25 
percent of their income (later increased to 30 percent) towards their rent and the 
government would pay the difference. 
Id. 
115. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 154.  The authors describe a market 
failure as follows: 
[W]hen the market does not provide the quantity of a particular good or service at 
which the marginal social benefits of another unit equal the marginal social costs of 
producing that unit.  In such a situation, the benefits to society of having one more 
unit exceed the costs of producing one more unit; thus, a rationale exists for some 
level of government to intervene in the market and expand the output of this good. 
Id. 
116. Id.; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 322 (arguing that the most compelling argument 
―for government involvement in multifamily finance comes by way overcoming information 
voids‖). 
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there was not enough information for multifamily mortgage underwriters 
to make informed decisions,
117
 this seems to be much less the case 
today.
118
  To the extent that there is a market failure in the multifamily 
mortgage market, it is caused in part by the large number of originators 
in the small multifamily submarket.  Such a low-concentration market 
increases transaction costs for secondary market investors seeking to 
conduct due diligence on many mortgages with different terms.  As 
opposed to the RMBS market, there is a great deal of variety in 
multifamily mortgage documents, which increases due diligence and 
legal review costs for underwriters and securitizers.
119
 
A final question is, if one were to generally support multifamily 
mortgage subsidies, whether smaller multifamily buildings should be 
subsidized at the expense of larger buildings.  This is an important issue 
in the debate over whether to provide new supports for this housing 
stock, as smaller multifamily buildings may be less efficient providers of 
affordable housing than larger ones.
120
  To answer that question, one 
 
117. See, e.g., Amy D. Crews et al., The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage 
Originations: What We Know and Why We Care, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 334, 365 (1997) 
(―Without better information, further development of a secondary multifamily mortgage 
market is likely to go slowly and lag far behind the single-family mortgage market.‖); 
Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50 (―[R]esearch indicates that small projects make 
up a niche market that is difficult and uneconomical to serve through standard multifamily 
lending practices.‖). 
118. AMERICA‘S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY, 
supra note 3, at 14. 
119. See, e.g., Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 50.  The authors note, 
The costs to investors of due diligence on nonstandardized loan pools of small 
project mortgages eliminate many pricing advantages of a structured transaction.  
Efforts to increase standardization could secure more access to efficient sources of 
long-term capital.  However, standardization may prove difficult to accomplish 
because of the heterogeneity of small project borrowers and the flexibility required 
to underwrite small project loans. 
Id.; see also Jean L. Cummings, Developing a Secondary Market for Affordable Rental 
Housing: Lessons from the LIMAC/Freddie Mac and EMI/Fannie Mae Programs, 4 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL‘Y DEV. & RES. 19, 20 (1998) (―An active secondary market requires 
standardization of the mortgage contract, underwriting and mortgage documents‖).  In January 
2009, the Joint Center made a related market failure argument—that private lenders exit the 
multifamily market during credit crises and government instrumentalities such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are needed to provide liquidity.  MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 
FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 5.  Given the problems faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac during the current credit crisis, this argument is less than compelling.  See David Reiss, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of 
Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/25. 
120. William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan argue that the smaller units in particular 
should be preserved.  For example: 
With new construction focused on expanding the supply of more expensive 
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should compare the cost of subsidizing a unit of a small multifamily 
building to prevent it from being taken out of service to the cost of 
subsidizing a unit of a large multifamily building to prevent it from 
being taken out of service.  In all likelihood, it is more efficient to 
preserve the unit in the larger building.
121
  After all, large buildings bring 
to bear an economy of scale that will tend to make them run more 
efficiently.
122
  In either case, however, if the housing supply is relatively 
 
apartments in large multifamily structures, the ongoing demolition and inventory 
losses of rental units in older small multifamily structures is rapidly depleting the 
available supply of affordable rental housing.  Most of the privately-owned small 
multifamily rental stock was built at least 30 years ago when construction 
techniques and capital markets were less sophisticated and households were less 
affluent.  Much of this inventory is now in need of substantial repair.  According to 
the American Housing Survey, 3 million private market rental units have severe 
structural deficiencies and are at risk of loss. 
Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 6.  In addition to the criticisms set forth in the text 
above, Apgar and Narasimhan fail to explicitly address the filtering process that occurs as 
newer, more expensive units are added to the existing housing stock and the extent to which 
that addition to the overall housing supply offsets inventory losses of older, small multifamily 
units.  See Matthew Edel, Filtering in a Private Housing Market, in READINGS IN URBAN 
ECONOMICS 204, 204 (Matthew Edel & Jerome Rothenberg eds., 1972) (defining filtering).  
They also fail to account for the fact that developments in the housing finance market such as 
the FHA–insured mortgage have allowed ―the average developer to build on a larger scale.‖  
WINNICK, supra note 38, at 159. 
121. In order to study whether smaller buildings are less efficient tools for preserving 
affordable housing, one would need to control for the quality of the housing provided by 
smaller and larger buildings.  Once that is done, it is very likely that the finding would be that 
larger buildings are more efficient.  See THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S HOUSING (2006), supra 
note 9, at 22 (noting that over the 1990s and 2000s ―new multifamily rental construction has 
shifted decidedly toward larger structures‖).  A further consideration is whether lower-density 
housing has positive externalities that should factor into any discussion of subsidizing small 
apartment buildings.  This appears to be a largely unexplored area of study.  There have been 
numerous studies, however, that evaluate the individual and community benefits of residential 
homeownership, as compared to rental tenancy.  See, e.g., ROBERT D. DIETZ, THE SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF HOMEOWNERSHIP (Homeownership Alliance, 2003), available at 
www.newtowncdc.org/pdf/social_consequences_study.pdf (surveying existing scholarship 
drawn from social sciences, medicine, psychology, and other academic fields).  Additionally, 
there is scholarship comparing the economic and health outcomes of moving families from 
high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty areas.  See Jeffrey Kling et al., Moving to 
Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency and 
Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment 4-5 (Harvard Univ. John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP04-035, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588942 (finding significant mental health benefits, some 
physical benefits, and no substantial economic benefits from participation in housing mobility 
program).  It remains, however, a completely open question whether housing density alone, 
controlling for all other factors, has an impact on residents sufficient to prioritize subsidies for 
small apartment buildings over those for larger buildings. 
122. See MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 2 (citing 
efficiencies in delivering social services, improving physical infrastructure, and achieving 
energy independence and sustainable development goals via multifamily communities versus 
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inelastic it is unlikely that even a generally available subsidy for 
multifamily properties is an efficient way to reduce the rate of loss to the 
affordable multifamily housing supply.
123
  The imposition of some form 
of rent regulation on the subsidized housing would be necessary to 
ensure that it remained affordable.
124
 
Apgar and Narasimhan have given form to the repeated calls by 
housing advocates to subsidize financing costs for small apartment 
buildings.  To give this proposal its due, it does attempt to address 
aspects of the efficiency argument.  To that end, Apgar and Narasimhan 
argue that the proposal would ―facilitate the ownership transfer of the 
critically important small-multifamily rental inventory from individual 
owner to institutional investor, and in doing so help gain needed scale 
economies to reduce the costs of property management, repair and 
maintenance.‖125  It is highly uncertain, however, whether the economies 
of scale contemplated by such a model would in fact be achieved: one 
private company that believed that it could achieve such economies of 
scale has found that it is much more difficult than it had foreseen.
126
 
CONCLUSION 
While it is incontrovertible that small-apartment-building owners 
are not all slumlords and social parasites, the argument in favor of 
 
single-family housing).  It is reasonable to assume that such efficiencies would be amplified, 
to some degree, in larger-scale multifamily housing.  Apgar and Narasimhan readily admit 
that ―[a]vailable evidence suggests the presence of significant economies of scale in the 
operation of larger buildings.‖  Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 22.  Indeed, the heart of 
their proposal is to duplicate the efficiencies of larger buildings by pooling smaller properties.  
Id. at 21-24, 28.  However, as argued above, there are more efficient means of promoting the 
overarching goal of affordable housing. 
123. Notwithstanding this concern about the small multifamily market, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude, along with James Follain and Edward Szymanoski, that ―standard 
contracts and data systems are public goods and government may want to invest in their 
development.‖  Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 161.  Such an investment would 
obviously be much more modest than an ongoing subsidy to landlords themselves. 
124. To be clear, Apgar and Narasimhan‘s S-REIT proposal does not call for mandatory 
subsidized rents or tenant income limits on the units owned by the S-REIT.  While writing 
that affordability could be enhanced by combining the S-REIT program with rental subsidies, 
at base the program relies on market mechanisms to preserve affordable housing: ―Even 
without subsidy, the [S-REIT] approach would help stem the loss of many small multifamily 
properties.  In doing [so,] it alleviates the ongoing pressure on market rents that undermine the 
well being of the nation‘s lowest income renters.‖  Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 27. 
125. Apgar, supra note 90, at 55. 
126. See James R. Hagerty, Beware the Foreclosure Allure—Redbrick’s Model of 
Scattered Bets Is Cautionary Tale, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at C19 (noting that private-
sector investor in scattered small apartment buildings did not achieve economies of scale but, 
rather, faced high costs). 
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subsidizing the financing costs for such property owners has not been 
won.  At best, its proponents might argue that it is a realpolitik response 
to the fact that direct subsidies to the poor are politically impractical, so 
it is better to support an industry—the housing industry—that provides 
services to the poor and is organized enough to defend those 
subsidies.
127
 
For a more principled defense, proponents of small-apartment-
building subsidy programs will need to respond to the concerns outlined 
above: is it a relatively efficient subsidy?  Is it responding to a market 
failure?  Those who favor such subsidies appear to have succumbed to a 
logical fallacy: they argue that because small buildings provide 
affordable housing and are at risk of loss, the most efficient way to 
protect affordable housing is to preserve these small buildings.  For the 
reasons outlined above, that conclusion does not follow: the 
indiscriminate subsidy of financing costs for the owners of small 
multifamily buildings has not been demonstrated to be good public 
policy.  More carefully targeted uses of government subsidies are 
therefore warranted to achieve housing affordability for low- and 
moderate-income households. 
 
 
127. Ellickson, supra note 94, at 30-31. 
